This study empirically investigates bank risk taking from a behavioral perspective. More specifically, we analyze the impact of an overconfident CEO, defined as one who has systematically upward biased beliefs about the returns of his investment projects, on bank performance and risk taking. Overconfidence is measured using a sample of international banks from 1997 to 2008 with full information on CEO option holdings. Ingersoll (2006) determines the optimal exercise time for undiversified option holders under realistic assumptions on risk aversion. Following Malmendier & Tate (2005) classify CEOs as overconfident if they keep their options too long to be considered rational. We find that banks with overconfident CEOs did not perform worse during the financial crisis but had higher risk throughout the sample period. However, active boards seem to mitigate this effect.
Introduction
This study investigates bank policies and bank risk taking from a behavioral perspective. Motivated by an overall sentiment in the public press that describes bank CEOs as risk seeking individuals who were not able to assess the riskiness of their institutions correctly, we look at CEOs overconfidence as an explanatory variable of bank risk. Overconfident CEOs have systematically upward biased beliefs about the returns of their investment projects. This leads bank managers to undertake high risk and possibly value destroying projects. Banks were clearly engaged in such high risk activities during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Tail risk has not been correctly assessed and financial institutions that seemed sound and adequately capitalized in the years before 2007 turned out to be heavily exposed to risky securities and in need of government support. The CEO as the ultimate decision maker is supposed to have some discretion on the risk taking decisions of a bank and is therefore the subject of this study.
Anecdotal evidence for bank executives' failure to assess risks appropriately confirms this conjecture. Goldman Sachs CFO David Vilniar, for example, famously told the Financial Times in 2007: "We were seeing things that were 25-standard deviation moves, several days in a row." To put that quote into perspective Dowd et al.(2010) argue that just one 25-sigma event is as likely as winning the UK national lottery 22 times in a row. Clearly Mr. Vilniar exaggerated to convey to the reader that the bank was hit by a very rare event. However, it is clear how banks' managers were underestimating risks, or in other words were too confident about future outcomes.
In this study overconfidence is measured using a sample of international banks from 2000 to 2008 with full information on CEOs' option and stock holdings. Ingersoll (2006) proposes a method to determine the optimal exercise time for an undiversified option holder under realistic assumptions on risk aversion. Our detailed option data with information on all option characteristics and on the exercise date allows us to value the options from a CEOs perspective and to calculate the optimal exercise time for each option in a CEOs' portfolio. Similar to Malmendier & Tate (2005) , we classify CEOs as overconfident if they keep their options too long to be considered rational.
Several articles have looked at the role of CEO overconfidence on corporate policies. Hribar & Yang (2011) argue that managerial confidence manifests itself as excessive optimism about future firm performance, leading managers to issue upward biased earnings forecasts which they then miss. The authors use the number of press articles where CEOs are called confident as their measure of overconfidence. However, such an overconfidence measure is almost impossible to implement in an international study, considering the differences in press coverage among countries. Ben-David et al. (2007) measure overconfidence by asking S&P 500 CFOs to predict future stock market returns. They find that overconfidence and optimism are persistent over time for a given CFO. Those classified as overconfident invest more in capital expenditures, make more acquisitions, have more leverage and are less likely to distribute dividends. Merger plans of their firms are negatively received by the market. Malmendier & Tate (2005) argue that risk averse CEOs should reduce their exposure to company-specific risk by exercising options prior to expiration. They follow Hall & Murphy (2002) to derive the optimal exercise point under reasonable assumptions and specify a CEO who does not diversify as overconfident. Their sample spans 394 large US firms from 1980 to 1994. Based on the work of Heaton (2002) they conjecture that Overconfident CEOs overinvest if they have sufficient internal funds and are not disciplined by capital markets and corporate governance mechanisms. If they do not have sufficient internal funds they curb their investment because they are not willing to issue new equity, due to perceived undervaluation. In a second paper Malmendier & Tate (2008) , they relate CEO overconfidence to the occurrence of value destroying mergers. This is the first study to investigate the role of CEO overconfidence in banking, and furthermore in an international setting. The global setting, with banks operating in different countries and under the supervision of different regulators, also allows us to look at the effect that regulators have on the likelihood of appointing an overoptimistic CEO and on the monitoring of a bank with such a CEO. Moreover, a complimentary dataset with detailed information on board composition and board activity yields insights on the role of corporate governance with respect to these issues.
We first look at the performance of banks during the financial crisis depending on their CEO being overconfident. Using market based and accounting based performance measures we do not find any evidence of CEO overconfidence on a bank's performance during the financial crisis. In a second step we investigate whether CEO overconfidence plays a role in determining bank risk. Using the standard deviation of equity returns and the distance-to-default as measures of bank risk we do find some evidence that more confident CEOs lead to higher bank risk. However, our results also show however that this effect is mitigated by a more active board. The decision to hire an overconfident CEO may depend both on the banks' internal corporate governance mechanisms and on the effectiveness of the regulatory environment. We address both issues by looking at the probability to hire an overconfident CEO depending on measures of regulatory strength and good corporate governance. We do not find any evidence of an influence of regulatory power on the decision to hire an overconfident CEO. However, more independent boards, with a lower ratio of women, tend to hire more often a CEO who is classified as overconfident.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and introduces the methodology used to classify CEOs as overconfident. Section 3 investigates the relationship between CEO overconfidence and bank risk, both during the financial crisis and over the whole sample period. Section 4 interacts the strength of the corporate governance mechanisms with the overconfident CEO's ability to take on higher risks. It also explores the determinants of the decision to hire an overconfident CEO. Section 5 concludes.
Data
Part of the data used for this study comes from a previous study on CEO compensation in the financial services industry Suntheim (2011) . It comprises detailed data on executive compensation for 113 international banks from 23 countries. The data items available are:
• Personal (CEO name, tenure)
• Cash remuneration (salary, bonus payments, long term incentive plans)
• Interest in the banks shares (direct or through restricted shares.
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• Stock options (grant date, vesting date, exercise price, exercise date, performance criteria)
The sample comprises all banks that provide detailed information on CEO compensation and that were among the world largest 250 banks by total assets in the year 2000. Therefore by construction the sample banks are very large international institutions with rather strict disclosure rules. This may imply implicit too-big-to-fail guarantees and possibly better corporate governance mechanisms. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the sample banks, it can be highlighted again that the sample consists of the very largest banks worldwide. For a smaller sample of 85 banks we supplement this data with information on corporate governance practices for each bank. The data items available cover the following areas:
• Information on the CEO (Is the CEO a member of the board of directors, and if yes is she the chairman of the board?).
• General information on the board of directors (number of directors, number of independent directors, fraction of female directors, number of board meetings).
• Information on the remuneration committee (Has a remuneration committee been implemented? Is the CEO member of the committee or does she attend its meetings? Is the CEO chairman of the committee? Number of committee meetings, number of independent directors on the committee). 
Subjective option pricing model
To classify a CEO as overconfident we use an approach similar to Malmendier & Tate (2005) . A CEO is considered overconfident if she exercises her option later than it would be rational under reasonable assumptions on risk aversion and diversification. To estimate the optimal exercise time for each CEO's option package we use a methodology first introduced by Ingersoll (2006) . It allows us, different to Malmendier & Tate (2005) , to compute the optimal exercise time for each option grant at each point in time individually.
Ingersoll (2006) derives an explicit solution to the option pricing problem of an undiversified individual holding an option that can be exercised after a certain vesting period and that is possibly tied to performance criteria. The model is based on the following assumptions:
First, the CEO lives infinitely and maximizes her expected utility with constant relative risk aversion γ:
Second, as in the standard Black-Scholes model there are no transaction costs or short sale constraints allowed, an assumption that is standard in the basic option pricing literature. Third, the CEO holds a constant fraction θ of her wealth in the stock of her bank. This assumption can be justified either by explicit minimum stock requirements, as they are common in many banks or by the amount of a CEO's wealth and human capital that is tied voluntarily to the stock market performance of her employer. Although no data on total CEO wealth is available, the amount of stock and option holdings of most sample CEOs is large in absolute terms. We follow Malmendier & Tate (2005) and assume this fraction of wealth in the bank's stock to be 66%. Moreover, a coefficient of constant relative risk aversion of five is assumed, consistent with findings in the behavioral finance literature.
The stockholding constraint forces an extra risk upon the CEO but not all of this risk is relevant since by adjusting the rest of the portfolio the CEO can eliminate some of it. Important for the subjective value of the option is therefore not the absolute value of stocks held but the excess holding restrictionθ . If this constraint is not binding, the subjective and objective value of the option are identical as are the optimal exercise dates. However, considering the large stockholdings of the average CEO and the small percentage each banks' stock would contribute to the market portfolio, it is reasonable to assume that the constraint binds.
The extra risk imposed on the CEO through the stockholding constraint can be potentially traded away partially. Ingersoll (2006) assumes a factor structure on asset returns with the factors being traded assets such that the CEO has the ability to trade away some of the risks. As suggested by Ingersoll (2006), we assume a very simple factor model and use the residuals of the CAPM to get an estimate of residual risk. 2 This would be correct for a manager that hedges only against market risks but does not take into account other risk factors, such as industry or country risks.
The manager holds therefore a fraction of her wealth in the banks' stock, a fraction in the factor portfolios and the remainder in the risk free asset. The optimal portfolio choice can then be determined and a closed form solution to the subjective option pricing problem is derived. The solution resembles the standard Black and Scholes formula with adjustments made to both dividend yield and to the risk free rate.
While standard American options on non-dividend paying stocks are optimally held till maturity it may well be the case that incentive options of an undiversified CEO are exercised well before this point in time. The decision to exercise the option early is however endogenous and therefore standard option pricing formulas cannot be used. ( Ingersoll ) uses for this reason the barrier-derivative approach which has been shown to be an accurate approximation and which can incorporate vesting conditions. The idea behind the barrier-derivative approximation here is to determine the optimal exercise policy, by using the class of constant exercise policies. This approximation yields a lower bound to the actual option value. 3 The approximate value of an unvested option is given by:
where Cbarr is the value of the barrier option with vesting constraint, and k is the barrier at which the option will be exercised. The option will therefore be exercised after vesting occurs, as soon as the option hits the barrier k or at maturity if the option is in the money. S is the stock price and T the time to maturity.
The optimal exercise time can be calculated by choosing the stock price at which exercising the option would be optimal from the CEO's perspective, and then estimating the expected time when this price would be reached.
Construction of the overconfidence variable
A CEO is defined as overconfident if the optimal exercise barrier is hit and the option has vested but the CEO does not exercise the option in her portfolio. Since each CEO has several options in her portfolio there are numerous ways to specify a CEO as overconfident and we are reporting various specifications in the following analysis. Our ten overconfident measures are defined as follows:
(1) At least 50% of the CEOs option packages have hit the optimal exercise barrier once but have not been exercised. (2) The barrier has been hit once for at least 75% of the CEO option packages. (3) In order to control for vesting criteria we require stock options to be 50\% over the optimal exercise barrier. At least 50% of the options must have hit this more stringent exercise barrier. (4) 75% of the CEO's options must have been exercised late according to the more stringent measure. (5) An option is classified as overdue when the barrier has been hit for more than twelve consecutive months. In some cases CEOs may be restricted to specific exercise periods during a year. This requirement should make sure that the CEO is actually able to exercise the options in her portfolio. 50% of the options need to be exercised early according to this criterion. (6) As (5) but requiring 75% of the options to be exercised early. (7) 50% of the options need to be for twelve months 50% above the threshold. (8) 75% of the options need to be for twelve months 50% above the threshold. (9) 50% need to hit the threshold computed with an alternative risk aversion coefficient of three. (10) 75% need to hit the threshold computed with an alternative risk aversion coefficient of three. Moreover we require each CEO to have at least five exercisable option packages in her portfolio during the sample period. At least 50\% of the CEOs option packages have hit the optimal exercise barrier once but have not been exercised. The optimal exercise barrier is computed assuming a constant relative risk aversion coefficient of five. Overconfidence2
At least 75\% of the CEOs option packages have hit the optimal exercise barrier once but have not been exercised. The optimal exercise barrier is computed assuming a constant relative risk aversion coefficient of five. Overconfidence3 least 50\% of the CEOs option packages have hit a barrier 50\% above the optimal exercise barrier once but have not been exercised. The optimal exercise barrier is computed assuming a constant relative risk aversion coefficient of five. Overconfidence4
At least 75\% of the CEOs option packages have hit a barrier 50\% above the optimal exercise barrier once but have not been exercised. The optimal exercise barrier is computed assuming a constant relative risk aversion coefficient of five. Overconfidence5
At least 50\% of the CEOs option packages have hit the optimal exercise barrier once but have not been exercised. The optimal exercise barrier is computed assuming a constant relative risk aversion coefficient of three. Overconfidence6
At least 75\% of the CEOs option packages have hit the optimal exercise barrier once but have not been exercised. The optimal exercise barrier is computed assuming a constant relative risk aversion coefficient of three. Overconfidence7
At least 50\% of the CEOs option packages have hit the optimal exercise barrier for twelve consecutive months but have not been exercised. The optimal exercise barrier is computed assuming a constant relative risk aversion coefficient of five.\\ Overconfidence8
At least 75\% of the CEOs option packages have hit the optimal exercise barrier for twelve consecutive months but have not been exercised. The optimal exercise barrier is computed assuming a constant relative risk aversion coefficient of five.\\ Overconfidence9
At least 50\% of the CEOs option packages have hit a barrier 50\% above the optimal exercise barrier for twelve consecutive months but have not been exercised. The optimal exercise barrier is computed assuming a constant relative risk aversion coefficient of five. Overconfidence10
At least 75\% of the CEOs option packages have hit a barrier 50\% above the optimal exercise barrier for twelve consecutive months but have not been exercised. The optimal exercise barrier is computed assuming a constant relative risk aversion coefficient of five. Summary statistics on CEO overconfidence. A CEO is considered overconfident if she exercies her options late. CEOs is the number of CEO per country.
Overconfidence measure 1-10 show the number of overconfident CEOs according to each measure of overconfidence.
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Overconfidence and bank risk
In this section we use the previously defined overconfidence measures to investigate the impact of an overconfident CEO on bank risk. First, we look at the performance of the sample banks during the financial crisis, then at the riskiness of the banks assets over the whole time period 2000 till 2008.
Bank performance during the financial crisis
In a first step we investigate the effect overconfidence has on banks' performance during the financial crisis. We expect that more confident CEOs may have invested in high risk assets before the financial crisis, assuming that they would be able to outperform the market; such a behavior could have led to worse performance during the financial crisis. Table 5 . Table 6 and Table 7 The results show that none of the performance measures depends consistently on the CEO's level of overconfidence. If any, there seems to be some evidence that more confident CEOs even performed better during the crisis. However, considering the small sample size and the few significant results this evidence is far from being conclusive. When looking at the control variables we see that, as one would expect, more capitalized banks performed better during the crisis. Similar to the findings in Suntheim (2011) CEO with high vega and low delta contracts where working in banks that performed worse during the crisis. This is in line with a risk incentive story, where high risk taking incentives led CEOs to take on more risk that unwound during the financial crisis. However these results do not appear to be significant when looking at banks' stock market performance. Possible explanations for that could be that markets discounted systemic banks beyond what would appear on their balance sheets.
Bank risk and CEO overconfidence
Having concluded that there is no evidence of bank CEOs' overconfidence impacting the way banks performed during the financial crisis, we look more carefully at the way overconfidence has impacted on bank risk throughout the whole sample period. Our measures of risk are the annualized standard deviation of equity returns -measured over a 120 trading day window -and the distance-to-default, defined as the number of standard deviations the value of assets is away from default. The default point used is the face value of debt with an assumed maturity of one year. The distance-to-default has been shown to be a leading indicator of bank fragility Gropp et al. 2002 . Table 5 and Table 6 report results for the regressions of the different measures of risk on the overconfidence measures and control variables. The control variables are the marketto-book ratio, the logarithm of total assets and the banks' capital ratio. The market-tobook ratio controls for differences in investment opportunities. The capital ratio controls for bank leverage and is defined as total equity divided by total assets. The log of total assets proxies for bank size. Large banks are more diversified than small banks but may take on higher risks because of implicit ``too big to fail'' guarantees. All regressions contain country fixed effects, year fixed effects and specialization fixed effects. Bank specialization is defined according to the Bankscope classifications, which group banks into investment banks, commercial banks, bank holding companies, mutual banks, savings banks and mortgage banks. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Table 8
Regression of the standard deviation of equity on overconfidence dummy and control variables. Control variables are the market-to-book ratio the capital ratio, bank size and the delta and vega of the CEO option portfolio. The measures of overconfidence are based on a minimum requirement of late option exercises. The measures with odd numbers are based on a 33\% cutoff, the measures with even numbers are based on a 66\% cutoff. Each regression contains bank specialization fixed effects and country fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Table 9 Regression of the distance to default on equity overconfidence dummy and control variables. Control variables are the market-to-book ratio the capital ratio, bank size and the delta and vega of the CEO option portfolio. The measures of overconfidence are based on a minimum requirement of late option exercises. The measures with odd numbers are based on a 33\% cutoff, the measures with even numbers are based on a 66\% cutoff. Each regression contains bank specialization fixed effects and country fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Table 8 shows for six out of the ten overconfidence measures a significantly positive effect on banks' standard deviation of equity returns. Results are more robust for the more stringent overconfidence measure, with significant coefficients for the overconfidence measures (6) to (9). Table 9 gives a similar picture with the distance-to-default as our measure of risk. Five out of ten overconfidence measures have a significantly negative effect on the distance-to-default, with the more stringent measures being the significant ones. For most of the measures the 75% cutoff criterion is related to banks' proximity to default. Larger banks with higher market-to-book ratios have lower levels of risk. The relationship between bank size and risk is most likely due to too-big-to-fail implicit guarantees or to higher levels of diversification. As one would expect banks with more equity capital have lower levels of bank risk and are farer away from default.
To conclude this section, we would like to point out that there seems to be some evidence that CEOs' overconfidence actually makes bank chose riskier policies which then leads to higher bank risk and higher levels of bank fragility.
Overconfidence, corporate governance and regulation
In this section we look more closely on the interaction between corporate governance mechanisms and the way CEO overconfidence influences bank risk.
Corporate governance and overconfidence and bank risk
Having established some evidence for overconfident bank CEOs to be employed in riskier banks, we would expect that corporate governance systems would be put in place to make sure that the overconfident CEO does not take on too much risk. Our measure of a more active board is the number of board meetings per year that we then interact with our overconfidence measure. The sample employed is slightly different to the one used in the previous section. Corporate governance variables are available only for a subset of banks, i.e. for the top five banks of each country during the period 2000 till 2008. The sample is therefore considerably smaller but does not suffer from a larger concentration in some sample countries, in particular in the United States. Table 10 and Table 11 report results for regressions of the risk measure on the different overconfidence measures and on the interaction between the number of board meetings and the overconfidence measures. The control variables are not reported to save space. Three important results emerge from this analysis. First, the effect of overconfidence on bank risk seems to be stronger in this subset of our sample. All the overconfidence dummies have a significantly positive effect on the standard deviation of equity returns and a significantly negative effect on the distance-to-default. This might be due to the particular set of larger banks or because of the lower representation of US banks. For example it is possible that due to some unidentified institutional setup US banks are less inclined to increase risk when their CEO is overconfident. Second, more frequent past board meetings are associated with higher levels of risk in the subsequent period. This may be due to a change in banks' focus on more risky business segments that would then also require a higher level of board oversight. Third, and most interesting, is that the interaction between the number of board meetings and the overconfidence dummy is associated with a decrease in the riskiness of the bank. This result holds true both for the standard deviation of equity and for the distance-to-default. It is direct evidence for the boards' ability to mitigate risk taking incentives of the CEO by improving oversight over the bank.
Table 10
Regression of the standard deviation of equity on overconfidence dummy, corporate governance interaction and control variables. The corporate governance variable is the number of board meetings in each year. The following control variables are included but not reported: the market-to-book ratio, the capital ratio, bank size. The measures of overconfidence are based on a minimum requirement of late option exercises. The measures with odd numbers are based on a 50\% cutoff, the measures with even numbers are based on a 75\% cutoff. Each regression contains bank specialization fixed effects and country fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level Table 11 Regression of the distance-to-default on overconfidence dummy, corporate governance interaction and control variables. The corporate governance variable is the number of board meetings in each year. The following control variables are included but not reported: the market-to-book ratio, the capital ratio, bank size. The measures of overconfidence are based on a minimum requirement of late option exercises. The measures with odd numbers are based on a 50\% cutoff, the measures with even numbers are based on a 75\% cutoff. Each regression contains bank specialization fixed effects and country fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. 
Corporate governance regulation and CEO turnover
In this section we explore the impact that corporate governance and supervisory power have on the decision to hire an overconfident CEO. We expect that both regulation and the strength of the board have an impact on the decision to hire a CEO who is overconfident. Although the type of CEO may not be easily verifiable, both regulators and board members may try to select a CEO with characteristics that match their own incentives. The effect of regulation could be twofold: First, a stronger regulator may be able to prevent an excessively confident CEO from being put in place and therefore reduce the likelihood of an overconfident CEO being hired. Second, banks' shareholders may try to compensate for stronger regulation by employing a CEO who takes on higher risks, which then could be an overconfident CEO. From a board perspective an overconfident CEO may be well aligned with shareholders' interests to increase bank risk, given implicit guarantees and the existence of deposit insurance schemes. On the other hand banks' boards do have a risk controlling function which could reduce the boards incentive to hire a more confident CEO. Table 12 shows results of probit regressions of a CEO dummy on controls and measures of corporate governance and regulation. The dependent variable takes value one if a new CEO is hired and she is overconfident, zero if she is not. Due to the small sample size, just a subset of the overconfidence dummies could be used for this regressions and results have to be viewed with caution, given the rather small sample, especially for a probit regression. The control variables used are the market-to-book ratio, bank size and the banks' capital ratio. Measures of board quality are the ratio of independent directors to the total number of directors, the ratio of women on the board and the size of the board. The number of independent board members and the size of the board are both measures of board effectiveness or board quality. Core & Guay (1999) argue that large boards are less effective in monitoring the CEO. Similarly, independent board members may be more powerful in monitoring the CEO. Women have been found to be less overconfident and more risk averse than men Barber & Odean (2001) . The two measures of regulatory strength used are Independence and Official Supervisory Power. The former measures to which degree supervisory authorities are independent from the government and legally protected from the banking system, the latter measures the degree to which supervisory authorities may intervene in the banking system.
Table 12
Probit regression of a dummy that takes value one if the new CEO is overconfident and value zero otherwise on controls and measures of corporate governance and regulation. The dependent variable takes value one if a new CEO is hired and she is overconfident, zero if she is not. Female is the percentage of women on the board, CEO boardmember is a dummy that takes value one if the CEO is member of the board, independence is the ratio of independent board members to total board members. Official is an index of supervisory power. Independence measures the independence of the regulator. The column number identifies the overconfidence measure used. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level The results in Table 12 suggest that the regulatory environment does not matter for the decision to hire an overconfident CEO. None of the regulatory indexes appears to be significant in any of the specifications. Corporate governance mechanisms however seem to matter, a large ratio of female directors reduces the likelihood of a new CEO being overconfident, in line with the initial hypothesis. Weaker and somehow contradictory are the results on board independence and board size. A more independent board seems to be more likely to hire an overconfident CEO while the likelihood is reduced by a smaller board. However the results on board size are just weakly significant. The positive coefficients of board independence are in line with the hypothesis that stronger boards are better able to align banks' incentives with shareholders' incentives, which in this case translates to higher risk taking by a more confident CEO.
Conclusions
This study introduces a new, behavioral perspective on bank risk taking. We use a well established subjective option pricing methodology to estimate the optimal exercise point for the options in a bank CEOs' portfolio. This option pricing methodology takes into account the CEO's ability to diversify her stockholdings but also the CEO's underdiversification and risk aversion. We then classify CEOs as overconfident if they fail to exercise their options optimally, i.e. if they exercise their options too late. Overconfident CEOs may underestimate risks and therefore invest in high risk projects.
To test this hypothesis we relate our overconfidence measures with measures of bank risk and with banks' performance during the financial crisis. While we do not find any evidence of overconfidence causing the banks' crisis performance, we do find that banks with overconfident CEOs have higher standard deviations of equity returns and a lower distance-to-default. A comprehensive dataset about corporate governance mechanisms at the bank level allows us then to interact measures of board quality with our overconfidence measure. We find that an active board, i.e. a board that meets more frequently, mitigates the effect of overconfidence on bank risk. We then try to capture the effect that good corporate governance and regulatory power has on the decision to hire an overconfident CEO. We find some evidence that a higher ratio of female board members to the total number of board members reduces the likelihood of hiring an overconfident CEO. The quality of regulation has no significant impact on this hiring decision. Overall this paper presents some evidence that behavioral characteristics of bank CEOs may actually influence bank performance and therefore ultimately also the stability of the financial system.
